Monday, November 10, 2014
Evil? No Problem
In sections X and XI, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?
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At the end of Hume’s dialogues, he has Philo argue for theism or for a finite version of god. The argument is that there exists suffering in the world, so because of that, either God isn’t all good, because suffering exists, God isn’t all powerful, because he cannot end suffering, or God is not all knowing, because he does not understand suffering or how to stop it. Further, to be infinite and still not be able to end suffering is simply not possible. That means that either god is choosing not to end suffering, which is not all good, or god is not capable of ending suffering, not all powerful. So, either this finite god exists, or there is no god at all. A common objection (not directly from Hume) to this is one that there are things in which god cannot control, such as matter and material world, and therefore those cause a contradiction to what God is trying to do. These external forces act against god, so that he cannot fully do his job.
ReplyDeleteTo this objection that there are external forces to which god can never fully overcome, I say, “Shenanigans!” In order to prove god, it was said that the cause for all beings or things was god and god only. When you throw in an argument that provides this thing that god cannot overcome, then how would god be causing the existence of that thing. It is impossible. Either God himself is not all good or knowing or powerful and therefore cannot fully prevent suffering, or there is no infinite got at all. So finally, a philosopher has provided the Great Judge Schneider with an argument that he will fully defend, and for that, Hume will get the award for Best Philosopher of All Time. Congratulations Dave!
In sections X and XI, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?
ReplyDeleteIf God is all powerful, all good, and all knowing, why is there evil in the world? This troubling question is addressed in the closing chapters of the Dialogues, and the conclusion isn’t very comforting to those who believe in a kind, wise, and powerful God. In abbreviated form, Philo argues that the existence of evil and suffering in the world is a proof against the existence of God; if he does exist, and is as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent as he is taken to be, he would smite all evil. As this isn’t the case, he therefore must not exist!
There are two responses that I have to disprove this argument; either God isn’t omnibenevolent or he allows evil to exist because he knows that it serves a greater purpose. To elaborate on the first scenario, it is possible that God isn’t all good, but instead resembles man in that his character is mostly good, but has flaws. Or, although the thought is disquieting, it is completely possible that God doesn’t care about his logical creatures and thus doesn’t care if they suffer or have pleasure. Either of these conjectures about God would support his existence and still account for the suffering in the world.
Next, it is plausible that God allows suffering to exist because it serves a greater purpose. I will address two of those purposes here: that it allows for the existence of free will or the existence of happiness. A world cannot exist which allows for the existence of free will and the absence of suffering, because free will allows people to make decisions which may cause the suffering of others. Hence, the benefits of having free will outweigh the costs of suffering, and suffering’s existence is justified. Finally, as was touched on in Plato, evil may exist because, without it, happiness can’t exist, because happiness is the yin to suffering’s yang. Thus, God may allow suffering to exist so that we can experience happiness intermittently.
Thus, Philo’s argument for the absence of a God may fail.
Does the fact that suffering exists in this world disprove either God’s existence, or at least his benevolence? Philo and Demea seem to think this aspect of suffering in society does in-fact create a case against God. They see God as one who is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, essentially, He is powerful enough to do anything He sees fit. Philo and Demea argue that if God truly existed, or was omnibenevolent, suffering would cease and desist. The cause for the end of suffering from the standpoint of the existence of an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God would simply be that He is all knowing, and therefore acknowledges suffering, is omnibenevolent, and would not want us to suffer, and finally, all powerful, He has the ability to end suffering. But, suffering is certainly present in society, so either this argument is correct, or reasonable objection exists.
ReplyDeleteI believe that this argument against God is flawed, and does not disprove His existence or benevolence. My objection to this argument uses theodicy, the idea that this suffering is all for a greater good. It is not that God doesn’t exist, or isn’t omnibenevolent, that suffering exists, God allows suffering into the world for a greater cause. This may sound somewhat strange, but, is a viable objection. The idea is that suffering is allowed into our world solely so that we are able to know what goodness truly is. For example, if one lived on the sun, they would not know light. This not knowing of light be a result of the lack of darkness. This is a similar idea to that of suffering and goodness. If God did not introduce suffering into our world, we could not know his goodness. It is His action of the allowance suffering that is for a greater good, disproving the argument that God cannot exist or at least be omnibenevolent as a due to the ever-present suffering in our world.
Furthermore, we can disprove Philo and Demas’ argument by considering all the possible scenarios of worlds regarding free will and evil. There are four combinations we can consider, a world with free will and evil, with free will and no evil, with no free will and no evil, and finally, no free will and evil. Right off the bat, we can throw away the world with no free will and evil, as that sounds like the worst world ever. Moving on, we can eliminate the world with free will and no evil because it simply not possible. How can we be sure that people will not use their free will for purposes of evil? With getting rid of these two worlds, we are left with a world with free will and evil, and a world with no evil and no free will. Which seems to be the better option? Living a life as a “Happy Robot” (Doc I.) or a life with free will and evil. The latter seems far more appealing, and therefore is our current situation. God has allowed evil because it is the best option. God is omnibenevolent, and makes sacrifices for our greater good.
Philo attempts to argue that God does not exist, or He is not benevolent, by making the argument of human suffering and asking the question of whether or not God has the power, or the will, to end all of the evil in the world. After Philo reiterates his point about how much suffering is in the world, he begins to lay out his argument by saying that if God is omnipotent, he can prevent suffering; if He is omniscience, He knows how to prevent suffering; and if He is omnibenevolent, He will want prevent suffering. Assuming that God is all of these things, there would be no suffering because God would not let it happen. Since we know that there is definitely suffering in the world, it can be concluded that God does not exist. On the other hand, if God does exist then that must mean that He is not benevolent because He does not wish to prevent suffering. The reasoning behind this argument makes sense but there are so many other possibilities including God and this exact principle, which can still lead to evil. For example, a possibility to consider when attempting to determine God’s existence under these circumstances would be that God is neither omnipotent, omniscience, nor omnibenevolent, which would take away a lot of his power, but it would also explain why he has not stopped humans’ suffering. The idea of theodicy says that suffering is a part of free will, which is an interesting concept because it says that in this world, there will be evil as long as there is free will. If this is the case, then the existence of God is not important in regards to the concept of human suffering, because theodicy means that there is no choice but to have evil in this world.
ReplyDeleteThere are many people who find comfort in the ideas of religion. Whether or not they have strong faith in God, a very large number of us find comfort in the possibility that somehow, somewhere, some omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being is looking out for our welfare. Yet, for an equally large number of us, the prospect of the existence of God is too absurd to warrant our faith. Essentially, the more suffering that occurs on earth (of which there is certainly a lot), the less likely it seems that some being exists who knows about our suffering, has the power to stop it, and is willing to do so. This is not a new problem, however, for as long as there has been controversy regarding the existence of god, this “problem of evil” has been a common argument. In Part X of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume deals with this problem, arguing that, while evil may exist in the world, the existence of God cannot be disproven, as this evil may still be outweighed by long term good. However, while this argument may make sense on face, its implications – of the complete abuse of human life – seem to suggest that the problem of evil is still alive and well.
ReplyDeleteAs Hume argues via his character Demea, the problem of evil (here referred to as the Epicurean problem, after the philosopher who first proposed it) is fairly straightforward, as he writes, “Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?” (63). Essentially, the problem arises out of the fact that, as long as evil and suffering exist in the world, the three traits of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence, commonly associated with god, cannot all exist in tandem. If we assume that God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then suffering, which God wants to and is able to prevent, would only occur if God is unaware of it – God is not omniscient. However, if we assume that God is omniscient and omnibenevolent, then suffering, which God knows about and wants to prevent, would only occur if God is unable to prevent it – God is not omnipotent. Lastly, if we assume that God is omnipotent and omniscient, then suffering, which God knows about and is able to prevent, would only occur if God wants people to suffer – God is not omnibenevolent. As Demea points out, suffering, in the forms of “remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair...” (61) exists throughout the world, and therefore, God, in his most perfect form, does not exist.
Or so it may seem; Hume, however, the theist that he is, is prepared to counter any atheistic argument. In response to the problem of evil, Hume turns towards the principles of theodicy – that there is some greater purpose behind the evils that exist in the world, and thus that God is still omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, even if the opposite seems true. As Hume, through his character Cleanthes, argues, “The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics” (76). Essentially, as Hume argues, the motivations and beliefs of God cannot be easily determined; there is a possibility that all of the suffering that occurs is somehow, for reasons that we cannot explain, being used by God in order to prevent suffering in the future. As Hume points out, our perceptions of the world have changed over time, as we, as humans, have come to realize “that there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this life” (76). Thus, we cannot definitively conclude that pure, unwarranted evil exists, so the problem of evil, according to Hume, isn’t so problematic at all.
ReplyDeleteYet Hume’s argument relies on a major assumption, one which isn’t exactly true – that a being that deliberately keeps his subjects ignorant, suffering without knowledge of any purpose behind their suffering, is, in fact, still good. First, we look towards a fairly simple argument to disprove this statement – were God to be truly omnipotent and omniscient, God would not need to utilize short-term suffering to achieve long-term welfare, as this God would be able to conjure up eternal goodness with no restrictions. Therefore, it is clear that this omnipotent, omniscient God cannot be omnibenevolent (maybe decently good, but not eternally good). However, we can go even further, from a more philosophical perspective, to prove that God is not even decently good, but purely immoral. If God is responsible for all of the suffering that occurs on earth, even if God is attempting to promote some long-term good, then God is directly using all humans as a means to an end, forcing those of today to suffer through disease, violence, and emotional pain, all to benefit those of the future. (I’m not going to explain why deontology is true right now, since I’m already over 800 words, but expect that to come next week.) Even for those of us who are skeptical of deontology, the implications are clear – God is fostering immoral mindsets, which tend to arise out of pain and suffering, and thus cannot possibly be promoting long-term good through short-term, near-universal suffering, for God’s actions therefore cause future immorality. Lastly, the very fact that God is using all of humanity in such an immoral manner exposes an additional immorality behind God’s actions – God’s deception of all of humanity. Deception in this manner, tricking people into believing that the world is a horrible, immoral place, as so many, myself included, are coming to realize, is nowhere near moral. Therefore, not only would a truly omnipotent, omniscient God be able to create eternal welfare without suffering, but any remotely omnibenevolent God would want to pursue this path, in order to avoid physical pain and debilitating deception. Thus, I negate.
Towards the end of his Dialogues, Hume presents an argument that raises concern regarding God’s existence, known as “The Problem of Evil”. The issue at hand is Philo’s response to Demea’s argument for the existence of God (which he had proven through the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)); namely that if God exists, by definition He must be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, and therefore no evil can exist in the world. The argument goes as follows: If God is omniscient, He knows that people suffer, if He is omnipotent, He could stop this suffering, and if He is omnibenevolent, He would will to stop suffering. The fact that suffering exists in the world, however, suggests that either God does not exist or one or more of His attributes are false. Specifically, Philo attacks the “omnibenevolent” argument, claiming that an “all-good” God would will against evil, and thus through his omniscience and omnipotence, get rid of all evil which exists in this World.
ReplyDeletePhilo’s refutation is highly false; a) it involves a definition of “good” and “evil” through an anthropocentric point of view, and b), even through an anthropocentric point of view, in order to access all the benefits of “good”, the presence of “evil” is often regarded as a prerequisite. Taking into consideration “a)”, the actions of God cannot be judged on a level of “good” or “morality” that the human (anthropocentric) world contains. According to many Abrahamic-theist scholars, God may judge human actions on a scale of morality; however, since God is infinitely more powerful than humans, who are humans to judge the actions of God? In other words, with our relatively narrow minds, how are we to know that the evil which exists in this world is not directed towards a “greater good” purpose?
This leads into point “b)”; even though we human beings may think that even the presence of a single example of evil means that the world is no longer a place of “all-good”, it may be the case that immense quantities of “good” are accessed as a result of this one, single piece of evil. For example, if God did not give us evil, how would we know what is good? “Good” is simply a relative term, in other words. For example, take the related point about the theodicy argument involving free will. Assuming we have free will, which is a debate in and of itself, why would God allow us the power to do evil? One prominent answer to this question claims that the simple act of resisting our desires to do evil and only doing “good” builds our souls for Heaven. Since Heaven is traditionally considered the only place with 100% good and no evil, God is “omnibenevolent” for giving us the opportunity to achieve Heaven, and this opportunity would only exist if we could prepare our souls for the “journey”. Since, as stated before, preparing our souls requires fighting off one’s willingness to do evil, the presence of this evil thus is prerequisite for reaching the ultimate good of Heaven. So, God’s providing us with evil actually strengthens the point that He is omnibenevolent.
I think that the evil problem is a good argument, but the possibility that evil is in the world in order for us to improve as human beings (theodicy) is an interesting objection that seems to invalidate it. The first premise is that there is lots of suffering caused by evil in the world. Demea enumerates these: “The whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted…necessity, hunger, and want stimulate the strong and courageous: fear, anxiety, and terror agitate the weak and infirm…” (59). Demea says that because of this evil, we turn to God for guidance and strength: “We incessantly look forward and endeavor, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and oppress us” (58). In this quotation, Demea suggests that God is intentionally not helping us, or is in fact intentionally hurting us. The next three premises concern the definition of God. If God is omnipotent, He should therefore be able to prevent all suffering in the world. It follows that if He is omniscient, he should know all evil and how to prevent it, and that if he is omnibenevolent, He should have the will and the desire to prevent it. Because this evil exists, God is missing at least one of these qualities, and therefore our definition of God does not exist.
ReplyDeleteThe argument of theodicy, however, leads to a different conclusion. Perhaps God allows evil into the world for us to grow and develop morally. In terms of free will theodicy, God had 4 options with which to make the world: a world with free will and evil, one with free will and no evil, one with no free will and no evil, and one with no free will and evil. The world with only evil and no free will just doesn’t make any sense. The world with only free will and no evil also doesn’t make sense, because free will leads to evil. Now it comes to having free will and evil or neither of the two. But how would a world with no free will and evil lead to our development or improvement? Would we benefit at all from living in a “spring break” world, where we have no control over anything but don’t do any wrong? Ultimately, there needs to be evil to challenge to see what we are made of, and God provides this for us not to punish us, but to strengthen us.
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ReplyDeleteIn one of the most famous attacks on theism as a whole, Philo attempts to rip apart Hume’s belief that God exists and/or the view that he is a benevolent being by bringing up the problem of evil in the world. This argument is brought up throughout people’s everyday lives mainly as a result of sadness. Every time a horrible event occurs in the world, people look to the sky and say ‘Why God.’ Particularly in movies, but even more so in real life, humans are shown losing faith in God because of a particular occurrence, most of the time a death of a loved one.
ReplyDeletePhilo’s argument in its simplest form is this: If evil is ever-present throughout the universe, if God truly created the world, what then can we concluded about him? The possibility that God allows evil is a challenging concept for people to accept, but is a very possible conclusion. Other conclusions from the proponents view are that God is either not capable of preventing evil but wants to, or does not want to thus making God unbenevolent. If God cannot prevent evil, that would mean he is not as powerful and omnipotent as Hume believes him to be. Hume, which of course helps the supporter’s perspective, dismisses Philo’s argument saying that as long as we deem God’s logic incomprehensible. Hume also argues that we must simply trust God’s logic and his perfection. One possible reason why God allows evil is the subject of free will. God wants to allow free will instead of having humans act as controlled robots, but at the same time allows evil. So then what can we conclude? This brings about a separate discussion on what type of universe we should want to live. In a world with no evil and no free will, a world with evil and free will (which is what Hume and Philo both agree we live in), a world with no evil and free will, or a world with evil and no free will (which would undoubtedly be the worst). This not only brings about the discussion of free will, but whether we actually have free will or not. That is an entirely separate discussion which I will dive into in my final project. In conclusion, Hume is not concerned with the problem of evil as a challenge to the common, perfect conception of God, but he is concerned with the inferences people will draw on God and their false belief of his nature. Hume’s conclusion is that God is morally neutral and indifferent. I believe Hume’s argument is relatively sound, but is not completely bulletproof. I believe that if God truly is as powerful as we think he is, he allows what we see now as ‘evil’ because he knows the future and has our best interests at heart.
Nearing the end of Hume’s dialogues, the question of God’s existence has been the center of attention for a good amount of time among the discussions. One specific counter-argument was made by Philo regarding the existence of evil and misfortune in the world; stating that God, who is all-powerful and Omnibenevolent would not create a world with so much cruelty and unjustified negativity. The fact that misery and evil were so prevalent in the world meant to Philo that god is either not a benevolent being, or simply does not exist, as the Benevolent God would not be responsible for the world we have today.
ReplyDeleteDemea returns with a counter claim; but what if the world we live in today is the best of all possible options? The backup claims to this argument are centered on the notion of free will in relation to evil; what are all of the possible combination of the two, and which one would the omnibenevolent being chosen? A list of all combinations is as follows: Free Will with Evil (The current world), Free Will with No Evil, No Free Will with No Evil, and No Free Will with Evil. Of these four, the obvious non-choice is No Free will and Evil, as neither of the two options is positive, making this the least-favorable life and therefore not a candidate to a benevolent deity. Then, Demea argues that Free Will and No Evil is either a naïve notion or an impossibility, as the quantity and variance among humankind makes evil almost a statistical certainty; different cultures with different perspectives, varying opinions between disagreeing individuals, and some people with simply radical views, will act on their thoughts and generate evil. Finally two options remain: No Free will with No Evil, and Free will with Evil; Demea states that of the two, the latter option is preferable. Obviously at this point it is rather subjective which of the two options is better, but it is important to note that the distinction is a lot less clear, meaning that an argument could be made that the fact that we DO live in a world with free will and evil means that an omnibenevolent God chose this to be the better option, functioning at least as evidence for the existence of an Omnibenevolent God.
Demea’s argument is, itself, decently sound. There is, however, an issue with the evil itself that may bring up further questions; specifically the distinction between Natural and Moral evil. Moral evil is explained through Demea’s first argument; it is based off of conscious decisions and involves a free will that is capable of decision making to do evil. Natural evil is a more difficult discussion, as there is often a distinction between evil done by humans and evil done by nature like earthquakes, tsunamis, or any traumatizing natural disasters that cause suffering to undeserving individuals. It seems like from this point, Demea’s argument still has some weight to it, but involves further explanation as to cover the implication of Natural Evil. In other words, Demea’s evidence is not solid, and requires a lot of small changes to be a more irrefutable claim; nevertheless it carries a decent amount of significance in the overall argument and should not be ignored.
In sections X and XI, Philo argues that God is not omnibenevolent because evil exists in our universe. If God truly had all the characteristics we give him then evil would not exist because he would know that evil exists, be powerful enough to eliminate evil, and wan to eliminate it. Yet it still exists; why is that? Philo says it is because God does not actually have that last characteristic, the characteristic of omnibenevolence.
ReplyDeleteThe counter argument to Philo’s statement is that God choose to leave evil because there was something much more important which he chose to give us. God gave us free will over removing free will from our universe. There were four possibilities when God created our universe, a universe with free will and no evil, a universe with free will and evil, a universe with no free will and no evil, and a universe with no free will and evil. The first universe ruled out was the last one. It was ruled out because it is the worst option so there is no reason for that to be the universe which we live in. The second option eliminated was the first one because God lacks the power and the capabilities to create that universe. So now God is left with two options, a universe with no free will and no evil or a universe with free will and evil. The next stage of the argument says that God chose the universe with free will and evil. He chose this because free will is so important that it is worth retaining evil. This counter argument leads to the failure of Philo’s original argument.
The generally accepted definition of god is one who is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent. A god who is Omnibenevolent would do everything in his power to end suffering. A god who is Omniscient would know about all suffering and know how to stop or prevent it. A god who is Omnipotent would have the power to end or prevent all suffering. In a world with a god who is all three of these things there would be no suffering. However, as Hume points out, there is a lot of suffering in the world, thus, it would seem, there is no god. Despite all attempts at a theodicy, I believe this argument is sound. Theodicy attempts to reconcile this argument, often by finding a reason why suffering must exist. Some argue that suffering is intrinsically inseparable from some form of good; they argue that suffering is for a greater good. However all of these arguments have the same fundamental flaw. If god created the universe with infinite power, good will, and knowledge, why would he create a universe in which suffering is intrinsically connected to good in any form? We classify god as the ultimate being, thus there can be no excuse for his failure unless he is not the ultimate being. Thus we can conclude that God is not omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent.
ReplyDeletePhilo, towards the end of the dialogues, offers us his thoughts on a restricted God. If God Is all powerful, then why does he allow suffering in the world? This must mean that God does not exist. A God with such great power and such a great amount of care for humans, would not let us suffer. This question is one of the many questions that David Hume addresses throughout the dialogues. Philo believes that evil, in its current amount, would not be able to exist if God is real. IF God does exist, then he is NOT benevolent. Hume, who suggests that he is not benevolent, questions God’s benevolence. God would not stand to let this evil consume our lives. For God to be benevolent, he cannot sit and watch us suffer, but rather end the suffering. Benevolence is the act of doing things for good, meaning and acting kindly. Watching his people suffer would not be an act of benevolence according to its definition. Hume suggests Gods malevolence, also the opposite of benevolence, because of God’s lack of effort to end suffering. If God exists, he is choosing to watch his people suffer, and is choosing to not use his great power to end their suffering. God is restricting his power so that he cannot use it to end the suffering. Hume’s alternative to this is that God does not exist. He cannot exist because God is defined as being benevolent, and a malevolent God cannot exist. Hume ponders this difficult reality of Gods true existence throughout the dialogues.
ReplyDeleteIn Sections X & XI, a very interesting argument is raised concerning issues with the supposedly benevolent nature of God’s existence. Dubbed the “Free Will Theodicy”, this situation considers four distinct alternate realities -
ReplyDelete1. One in which evil exists and humans have no free will
2. One in which evil is nonexistent, and humans have free will
3. One in which evil is nonexistent, and humans have no free will
4. One in which evil exists, and humans have free will… (Our world)
In situation one, we find the scenario is unreasonable and has no benefits. In situation two, we find this scenario is ultimately unachievable. In situations three and four, we find that although up for debate, the situation which is most desirable is the one we currently live in.
However, we are also met with a difficult notion -
We supposedly have a God who is omniscient, and understands how to prevent evil.
We supposedly have a God who is omnipotent, and is capable of preventing evil.
We supposedly have a God who is omnibenevolent, and desires to prevent evil.
How is it, considering these three facts, that we currently have evil in our world today? Hume argues that these facts contradict the common image of a supremely powerful God, and in my opinion, this argument successfully argues that either there is not a God, or that if there is, that he is not as supremely powerful as modern conventional religion implies.
Philo’s argument against the existence of a benevolent god is sound, though there are some grounds for objection. Philo works with demea to list the three main qualities attributed to god, omnipotence, Omni benevolence, and omniscient. Philo claims that that there is suffering in the world, he says if god was all knowing he would know that there is suffering, if he was omnipotent he could prevent suffering, and if omnibenevolent would want to prevent suffering. Philo claims that god could not exist by these three definitions, because suffering would not exist since god would choose to prevent it. This argument successfully strikes down the existence of god within these narrow definitions if there were not other factors, like free will. There are multiple theoretical worlds formed, one of evil and free will, evil and no free will, no evil and no free will, and no evil and free will. The first would of evil and no free will is defacto eliminated, the world with free will cannot exist, because nothing would stop free will from being converted to evil. Down to the last two of no free will and no evil and free will and evil. Because a world with no free will and no evil would be slug like and stagnant, the choice ends in a world with both evil and free will. This then justifies the definition of god, for instead of choosing to eliminate suffering, which would eliminate free will, god chose to keep both in the world. Philo’s argument against God’s existence is valid, but falls apart when it is introduced to more that a black and white situation of suffering and no suffering.
ReplyDelete