Evil? No Problem

In sections X and XI, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?

No Brute Facts -- The Principle of Sufficient Reason

You are hiking in a remote wilderness, miles from the nearest building or even cell phone tower. You come upon a clearing and see a crystal sphere hovering over you and emitting colorful light pulses in some seeming order: red, blue, green and the pattern repeats. Should there be an explanation for this odd phenomenon or is it acceptable to shrug our shoulders and mutter "Stuff happens"? Can we extrapolate from this case to a general principle of the universe? If so, can we prove that God (or a reasonable facsimile) exists?

The Relevance of the Origin of Species

One important scientific development unavailable to David Hume or any of his fictional interlocutors is the theory of evolution. For many people today, both theists and atheists, religious believers, scientists and intellectuals, the truth of evolution is bound up with the truth of theism. So what is the significance of evolution for the design argument? Does is it provide evidence for either side of the debate? On this 155th anniversary of the publication of Darwin's seminal Origin of Species, it is fitting to ask: where might a discussion of Darwin have fit into Hume's Dialogues?

Animal, Vegetable -- Or Machine?

In Parts VI & VII of the Dialogues Philo argues that the analogy between the universe and a machine that is so central to the design argument is not the only plausible analogy.  In fact, he argues that their are similarities between the universe and an organism (either animal or vegetable) that are at least as likely.  Yet if the universe is like an organism, no designer or intelligence (that is no deity) is requried.   Is he correct?  Are there relevant similarities between the universe and an organism (what about the similarities that Philo himself discussess)?   Is the analogy to an animal or vegetable as likely as, more likely, or less likely than the machine analogy?

God -- Or Some Lesser Designer

In Chapter V, Philo devises several arguments that accept that the universe has a designer, but deny that that designer is God. Given our traditional definition that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, is Philo correct? Or is there a response to his arguments? Does it matter if the designer is the traditional God?

Evidence and Theism

In response to Demea and Philo's attack on reason in Part I, Cleanthes proposes a principle that he thinks should be applied to any belief, including belief in God's existence.  He proposes that believers "proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs" (9).  In other words, we are justified in believing something if and only if we have evidence  -- and the degree of our belief should be calibrated to the strength of the evidence.  Is that true in every case?  What about regarding our belief in God?  Pascal, for example, proposed in his famous wager argument that, assuming there is no strong evidence either way,  it is in our best interest to believe in God.  Given the importance of accepting or rejecting theism for one's life values, is it ever permissible to believe (or disbelieve) in God on flimsy evidence?

Macbeth's Dagger and Other Illusions

Hylas objects to Philonous' idealism by claiming that on his view there is no way to distinguish between veridical appearances and illusions. In other words, idealism implies that the danger than Macbeth sees before his eyes but cannot clutch is just as real as the dagger he uses to kill Duncan. Is this a valid objection? How successful is Philonous' response?

What You See Is What You Get

Berkeley argues that skepticism is only possible if there is a distinction between appearance and reality.  Furthermore, he claims that that distinction collapses once we deny the existence of material substance.  Given these two premises, he concludes that skepticism in false.  But is he correct?  Does the distinction between appearance and reality collapse if idealism is true?  Is it possible for God to perceive an object differently than me?  Does that possibility redrawn the line between appearance and reality? Are there other problems with this argument?

Who Needs God?

Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?

Much Ado About a Mite

Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?

If a Tree Falls in the Woods . . .

If a trees falls in the woods and there is nobody around to hear it, does it make a sound?  Discuss.  You might want to define what you mean by a "sound," by "nobody," and perhaps even a "tree."

A Noble Failure?

Many of us in class found Descartes' foundational project to fail. Let's assume that he cannot justify all his claims to knowledge by an appeal to the Cogito. What can we learn from this failure? Should we look for a wider class of foundational beliefs? Should we avoid appeals to a God who is not a deceiver? Should we find a different way to justify beliefs that does not require an appeal to foundational beliefs?

"A Supremely Perfect Being"

In Meditation V, Descartes presents his version of the ontological argument for God's existence. He argues that his argument ensures that "the existence of God ought to have for me at least the same degree of certainty that truths of mathematics had until now"(44). Is he right?  Explain Descartes' argument in your own words and investigate whether it is successful.

A God Chasing His Tail?

Antoine Arnauld (among others) famously accuses Descartes of arguing in a circle: the principle of clear and distinct ideas requires a non-deceiving God to validate it, but the proof of a non-deceiving God requires the principle of clear and distinct ideas. Is Arnauld correct? If not, why not? If not, at what cost?

The Role of God

Descartes attempts to prove God's existence in Meditation III in order to rule out the possibility of an evil genius and to ensure that everything he clearly and distinctly perceives to be true is in fact true. Without discussing the merits of the argument (which we only summarized in class), discuss the role of the existence of God in Descartes' project. Assuming he can prove God's existence, can God guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas? Can God guarantee sense perception? Is it wise that God plays such a prominent role in his project?

The Cogito

In Meditation II, Descartes believes he has both defeated skepticism and discovered a foundational belief that he will use to justify all his other claims to knowledge. He argues that the very act of doubt proves that he exists. Is he right? Does the Cogito disprove skepticism? Even if it does is it a Pyrrhic victory -- or can this belief be the basis for the rest of his knowledge?

When the Walls Come Tumbling Down

Descartes realizes that some of the beliefs he thought were true turned out to be false. In the pursuit of knowledge he seeks to tear down his previous beliefs and build them up again upon a firm foundation. In other words, he is engaged in a foundational project, searching for a class of beliefs that themselves are not in need of justification in order to justify his other beliefs. But is this quest a misguided one? Do such beliefs exist? If not, does that mean that knowledge is impossible? Or is there some other way to justify our beliefs?

Is Morality Always Best?

1.      The whole point of The Republic is to prove that following morality is advantageous, not from external rewards but from internal benefits.  In other words, he wants to prove that it is not in our best interest to use the Ring of Gyges.  Discuss any of his arguments from Chapter 12.  Do they work?  If so, why do they work? If not, what is the flaw?

Plato's Cave

Plato argues that most of us are like prisoners in a cave who are bound in such a way that we can only see shadows of objects projected on a wall. Not only can we not see the objects that cast the shadows, we cannot even see the objects outside of the cave. A more modern analogy might have the prisoner's watching a movie or perhaps "plugged in" to a virtual reality program. What is Plato claiming about the ordinary person? What is our epistemic state? Do we have any hope in escaping? And most importantly, is Plato correct? In short, what is your interpretation of Plato's allegory of the cave and is the allegory the correct way to view the human quest for knowledge?

Expertise or Popularity?

Plato criticizes democracy throughout The Republic. In Chapter 8, for example, he compares the state to a ship. He argues that it is better to have a captain knowledgeable about navigation steer the ship rather than untrained crewmembers. The crewmembers may be able to persuade the owners to let them sail the ship, but without the proper expertise, the ship will not reach its destination. In other words, Plato argues that democracy rewards popularity over expertise, but it is expertise that is essential for good government. Is he right? Consider some examples from class. Can democracy deal with such long-term issues as global warming when most people would prefer to ignore them? Can it deal with economic recovery when most citizens don't understand economic theory? Or can you give a point in democracy's favor?

Is Plato a Feminist?

Plato, through the mouthpiece of Socrates, advocates some radical views about woman in Chapter 7 of the Republic.  In particular, he argues not only that women can be guardians, but that they can have equal duties (more or less) and an identical education.  The only exception he makes is for physical difference between the sexes.  These views are in stark contrast to a woman's place in 5th century Athens, in which a woman was prohibited from a political life and confined to the domestic household (and had a similarly limited education).  Does it make sense to call Plato a feminist (and does it depend on your notion of feminism)?  Or does Plato still miss something important about women?  Furthermore, have we in 21st century America realized his ideas?

The Definition of Morality

In Chapter 6 of the Republic Socrates defines morality in terms of the proper functioning of the mind.  He states that "[i]ts sphere is a person's inner activity; it is really a matter of oneself and the parts of oneself"(443d). A person is moral if and only if the parts of her mind work together and the rational part guides and directs the other parts.  Given such a definition, Socrates proceeds to show that such a mind is healthy and a disordered mind leads to unhappiness.  Yet is Socrates' definition of morality correct?  Is that definition close to your working definition of morality?  If he fails, where or how does he fail?  Is the connection between morality and mental health as tight as Socrates argues?

Hasta La Vista Homer

As Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger used arguments similar to Plato's in The Republic to restrict the use of violent video games for minors. Even though the law was eventually ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, is such a law morally justified? Examining ONE of Plato's arguments. Can a case be made to prohibit video games? Or is the argument flawed or not applicable to video games? Is the argument more valid as video game technology improves and the simulation of reality more seamless? Is there any form of entertainment that should be kept out of a teenager's hands (or minds)?