Wednesday, October 22, 2014
Much Ado About a Mite
Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
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In regard to relativity of perception, Berkeley argues very convincingly for idealism in the first dialogue between Hylas and Philonous; however, the argument fails to disprove the existence of material objects.
ReplyDeleteThe image used to demonstrate relativity of perception is that of a mite’s foot from the perspective of the mite, a human, and a microorganism. Berkeley first says that “the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being” (24). It can be assumed, then, that if the senses are meant for survival that they can be trusted. Further, unless inhibited by an external force, they are always reliable. Next, Berkeley goes on to explain how a mite may view its own foot, “and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension,” while humans may not be able to perceive it at all (24). Further, the microorganism sees the mite and its foot as overwhelmingly huge because it itself is so tiny in proportion. Each thing that perceives the foot can trust its own senses, and so can rightfully judge the foot based on their perspective. To each the mite, the human, and the microorganism, the foot possesses a different size – “dimension,” as Berkeley calls it. This poses a pretty distinct contradiction to the idea that size is inherent in the object. In fact, in the dialogue, Philonous and Hylas both agree that one thing cannot “be at the same time in itself of different dimensions” (24). Berkeley extrapolates this conclusion to such qualities as figure, texture, solidity, and color. What is so impactful about this argument, in my opinion, is how well Berkeley highlights how the way we judge things is so arbitrary. As humans, we have created what appear to be objective scales by which we measure figure, size, solidity, etc.; but really, the scales are subjective in that they only account for a human point of view. Mankind’s superiority complex strikes again.
Berkeley’s failure is that he does not disprove the existence of material objects. Rather, he disproves the existence of inherent qualities - saying that we only perceive secondary qualities, which exist in the mind instead of the object itself. The question I would like to pose is this: Just as we are limited in how we perceive dimension, could there not also be a limitation in our senses that does not allow us to experience an object’s material-ness? In fact, Hylas later suggests a similar issue, saying that we can never understand the true nature of physical objects. Also in a later dialogue, Berkeley argues that God allows us to perceive only what he wants us to perceive. Without knowing if God is supremely good, it is difficult to conclude that He is not withholding the true material-ness of things from us. Finally, if an object does not physically exist, how can there be anything to be perceived or to impose sensations upon our eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin?
Berkeley's argument for idealism through the relativity of perception is a success in that it proves why size is subjective. Berkeley uses the analogy of a mite to simulate how size can be a subjective usage of perception.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley states that extension and figures are both external unthinking substances. A mite will seem bigger to a creature smaller than that mite yet will seem substantially small for a human being. Next, Berkeley says that secondary qualities exist only in our minds since what seems big to some creatures will seem small to others. Perception by sense exists only in outwards objects. Size is in the mind of the perceiver. Size is a relative term. We are subjective in the way that we measure size because we relate it all to our size by nature. This idea does not make sense because there is no way something can be both big and small at the same time. How can the mite be both big to the microorganism and small to human beings? Berkeley asks: " Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions?" (page 24). Berkeley deems it impossible for something to be considered two relative terms at the same time. Humans have developed a system in which all is subjective to our point of view on things. This is proved to be wrong since other creatures might have a different point of view on our measure system, we cannot look at ourselves as the superiors that have the right to call something "small" or "big".
Berkeley justifies why relativity of perception is false because he proves that dimension sizes are dependent on human minds. One cannot be “small” or “big” without our perception of that very same object. One thing cannot be more than one size at the same time, therefore our sizes are subjective and cannot be used.
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ReplyDeleteBerkeley uses the example of a mite to attempt to argue his idealism for the relativity of perception, but is not successful. He goes about this argument by saying that all animals were bestowed with the same capability of senses. A mites foot appears to itself to be normal sized but, to us, is rather small. This breaks the law of non-contradiction, as one thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time, in the same way. As a result, size is in the mind of the perceiver, supporting idealism, insofar as this argument hold true. In this argument, Berkeley completely fails to take into consideration a standard, universal measurement. A standard is the same for everyone, it does not change between measurers. An inch is the same for me, as it is the same for a mite. My foot is 11 inches long, regardless of who is perceiving it. One could say that the extension of something is not relative to the perceiver. If you have a piece of chalk, it has extension and figure. No matter what you do to it, these characteristics still remain if it is broken again. As long as it still has sensible parts, the chalk will have extension and figure. The nature of this chalk is independent of any observer. It does not rely of subjective judgments, and thus, Berkeley’s argument is unsuccessful.
ReplyDeleteIn his dialogue with Philonous, Berkeley argues that size only exists in the mind, and that this classification as a secondary quality proves the concept of Idealism; that everything exists only in the mind. Berkeley’s logic seems to be sound in his assertion that size only exists in the mind, but he neglects to account for a key detail which brings doubt to the foundation of his argument.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley uses the example of a mite’s foot in order to convey his idea, beginning by stating that, “A mite must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it” (24). This basis is simple enough; a mite has senses just like humans, so it can distinguish its own foot. However, he continues by reminding Philonous that “at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points…and to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger” (24). The mite’s foot is viewed in varying sizes depending on the perspective and size of the viewer. Berkeley then concludes his argument, proclaiming that, “both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite’s foot” (25). Berkeley understands that should something exist outside of the mind it would only have a single identity; yet the mite’s foot is perceived in numerous different forms, each perception giving it another identity and therefore making it impossible for the size of the foot to exist as a material quality independent from the mind.
Despite the logic in Berkeley’s argument, he fails to understand the potential that the all but one of the perceptions could be false. If only one perception is true than the foot only has one identity—and vice versa—and can therefore exist as a material substance. Were this to be true, it would not only dismantle Berkeley’s argument about size being relative but would disrupt the entire concept of Idealism. Idealism requires all qualities to be part of the mind, but this one counterexample would disprove Idealism.
Berkeley uses his mite argument to argue for idealism by showing that even some properties such as size that seem inherent to objects are actually just perceptions, but his argument is unsuccessful. Berkeley begins his argument by having Philonous ask Hylas if animals other than humans have the ability to perceive through senses, and Hylas says that they do. Berkeley has Philonous pose this question in order to verify that for a hypothetical situation, a mite has similar senses to a human. Philonous then says, “A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible” (Berkeley 24). Berkeley says that while a mite may appear tiny to us, and its foot even tinier, the size of its foot seems perfectly normal to the mite. The mite would perceive our foot as huge, and animals smaller than the mite would perceive its foot as huge. In this way, the same object can be both big and small. Berkeley says that it is absurd that an object can have different dimensions at different times, so the differences must be due to differences in perception. These differences in perception cause size to be a quality of the mind and hence a secondary quality, not a primary quality as was previously assumed. Berkeley’s argument is unsuccessful because he does not factor God, whose existence Berkeley accepts, into the argument. Assuming there is a God as Berkeley claims, God would have created everything, and be able to perceive and understand everything because a lack of perception would show an imperfection and God is perfect. Therefore, size is actually an objective quality as long as it is perceived by God. The way humans and mites perceive size is incorrect because it is not objective. Humans see size from one incorrect perspective and mites see it from another incorrect perspective. God is the only perfect being, so every other being such as humans and mites must be less than perfect. It is possible for a less than perfect being to perceive size incorrectly because the only being that is correct one hundred percent of the time is God.
ReplyDeleteIn his analysis of primary qualities, Berkeley argues for idealism by claiming that the size of an object is only perceived by the mind; however, he ignores the possibility that size may have inherent objectivity if analyzed differently.
ReplyDeleteIn his first dialogue, Berkeley’s argument allegedly affirms idealism by saying that size is only in the mind of the perceiver and not in the object itself. The object that is perceived in his project is the foot of a mite. He claims that since all animals are capable of perceiving things, the foot of the mite can be perceived both by a human and by some creature that is considerably smaller than the mite. Berkeley asserts that from the human’s perspective, the mite’s foot would appear to be no larger than a visible point. That means that the foot would appear to be so small that the human couldn’t even see any dimension in it. At the same time though, Berkeley argues that to a creature much smaller than the mite, the mite’s foot would seem incredibly large. The mite’s foot to the smaller creature would look much the same size that the human foot does to the mite. Finally, Berkeley concludes that it is absurd for the mite’s foot to be perceived as incredibly small by one thing and then incredibly large by another all at the same time. Being only an example, Berkeley can use this proof to claim more generally that the size of any object is solely in the mind of the perceiver. Accordingly, size exists only in the mind and “ese est percipi”, to be is to be perceived.
While convincing, Berkeley’s proof of idealism has two potential flaws. First of all, it is possible that, overall, there is definite perspective of size. Berkeley himself agrees that God is an omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient being. He also agrees that god is constantly viewing every object in the world. Since God is both perfect and viewing the object in question, it would be absurd to say that God’s perspective of the object is false. So God, the divine author of all of the things in the world, would necessarily possess an objectively true and undeniable perspective of the object. This means that God’s perspective is an objective perception of an object’s size. So regardless of whether or not we can actually identify what God’s objective perception is, we can’t deny that it exists insofar that God exists. Berkeley’s confirmation of God’s existence single-handedly disproves his own argument against primary qualities.
My second response to Berkeley’s argument says that regardless of the perceptions of an object, an object possesses a measurable size. While it is reasonable to conclude that two things can perceive something differently, objective measurement, achieved through counting or the metric system, can supersede their viewpoints. For example, if Jay-Z observes the Empire State Building from the New Jersey coast, he may claim that it is incredibly small. Beyoncé, who observes the building while standing at its base, will probably conclude that it is incredibly large. At the same time, both members of the famous pair will be able to count the floors of the building. When they reunite at some delicious New York City pizza parlor, they may fight about whether the building is large or small, but they will undeniably agree that the building has 102 floors. In relation to Berkeley’s argument, systems like counting or the metric system can be used to conclude that regardless of whether the object seems large or small, it will have a definite size that is intrinsic property of the object itself.
In order to let this second objection hold though, we must consider Berkeley’s response to objective measurement. Berkeley would likely say that a measurement system alone is relative to the perceiver, meaning that any quantity pulled from a ruler or meter stick can be considered large by some and small by others. There are two points that directly combat Berkeley’s response. First, given that there is a measurement system, it is unnecessary to define how a thing is perceived. For example, if I measure the mite’s foot to be 10 micrometers, it doesn’t matter how that size is perceived insofar that we are only trying to proof that size is objective. I can claim that 10 micrometers are incredibly large, or I can claim that they are small, but in the end, they will always measure to be 10 micrometers. Essentially, by using an objective system, Berkeley is wrong in referring back to perception because there is no longer any need for considering perception. Second, it is preferable to identify size not by an object’s relationship to the size of the observer, but by an object’s relationship to the size of other things that are similar to it. In Berkeley’s argument, he claims that an object is labelled as either large or small due to how it compares to the creature that is observing it. This is an illogical comparison because it compares two things that are completely different. Instead, an object should be determined as either large or small by how it compares to another object that is similar to it. For example, a mite may be considered large when compared to bacteria and small when compared to a human, but overall, that mite will have a definite relative size when compared to the rest of its species. This is the difference between a human saying, “that is a small thing” and “that is a small mite.” The second statement is much more precise because it defines what the mite is small in comparison to, that is, other mites. Additionally, the second statement affirms objectivity because if the mite is 100 micrometers in length, it will definitely be a “small mite” if the average mite is 150 micrometers in length. So Berkeley’s characterization of large and small is not being compared to a specific object whereas the new comparison identifies that an object’s size should be compared to other similar objects, making size objective and an inherent quality of any object.
ReplyDeleteAfter having proven that some qualities, such as color, sound, and taste, are perceived differently by every individual mind and thus are secondary qualities non-inherent to the objects embodying them, Berkeley continues to prove that inherent primary qualities such as shape, motion, and extension are actually non-inherent and secondary as well. After a short debate establishing that animals are given the senses for the same purpose as human beings, Hylas and Philonus argue about the size of a mite's foot. Philonus argues that a mite's foot is "hardly discernible" by humans, but like a "huge mountain" for an extremely minute creature. He questions, “Can one and the same thing be…of different dimensions?”. He concludes it to be absurd that "that perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot" (25), and thus the formerly primary quality of extension is now a secondary one. He goes on to prove the same for motion, shape, etc.; that they and all other primary qualities are actually secondary qualities existing solely in the mind. Like an onion being peeled, what is left at the end is nothing; all qualities exist in the mind, which is the fundamental concept of idealism.
ReplyDeleteThe success of this argument depends on the true definition of extension. As stated above, Philonus argues that it would be absurd that one object would have two different dimensions, which is correct to argue, but this is not the case. Whether perceived by me or by a bacterium, the mite’s foot is a centimeter in length, for example. Thus, one can conclude that the mite’s foot always has the SAME dimensions, so the fact that the mite’s foot is 1 centimeter in length is an inherent quality. In other words, extension is inherent to the object; all minds perceive the mite’s foot as 1 centimeter in length, and since all minds perceive it equally, extension is not subject to the mind, but to the object. One could apply this to all other primary qualities and prove they are not based on the mind, and thus not secondary. However, if we consider the bacterium, 1 centimeter is larger than itself; for me, one centimeter is smaller than my fingernail. The fact that 1 centimeter is big or small is based on the individual mind and its perspective. So, the judgment of the perception of something is based on the mind and secondary, and all minds would have different such judgments. Yet, since Philonus refers to extension itself as a quality, and not to the judgment of extension, his argument is essentially invalid.
The millimeter, unlike a relative, subjective adjective like “large” or “small”, exists as a real, defined quantity, as the distance which light travels in a certain amount of time. At that point, Berkeley, were he to continue arguing that size is not an inherent characteristic, would have to disprove the idea that light has a single, objective speed, something which would certainly rile up scientists across the globe.
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, by similar logic, Berkeley’s earlier arguments, that temperature, taste, odors, sounds, and colors, are equally subjective and extrinsic, can be disproven. Even if hot, cold, loud, quiet, red, and orange are subjective, objective measurements of temperature (based on the movement of gas molecules) as well as sound and color (both based on frequencies and wavelengths of waves) exist. Additionally, while identical odors and tastes may be perceived as pleasant by some and displeasing by others, objective characteristics can be assigned to such phenomena based on the chemical properties of the objects which possess them. Therefore, one by one, primary characteristics can be proven objective, and intrinsic properties are, much to the chagrin of Berkeley, restored to objects.
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ReplyDeleteBerkeley, in his argument on relativity of size, intends to prove that the qualities which we believe are inherently part of an object are actually not a true part of that object's nature. For example, he says that a mite's foot will look quite small when the observer is a human, normal-sized when being looked upon by a mite, and very large through the eyes of a microscopic being. This argument goes to show that although we believe objects have inherent sizes, these sizes are actually only relative to the observer and an object has no true size. This argument also applies to colors; he says that we can view something as one color through the naked eye but then find it to be a different color on the microscopic scale. Once again, he says that objects have no true color and that this quality is not a true part of the object. Both of these arguments intend to prove the point that there really is no such thing as a quality of an object outside of the mind; all qualities that we believe are part of something's existence (both those considered to be primary and secondary) are actually perceived by different beings in different ways and are therefore inside the mind and not an inherent part of the object. Hylus starts out believing that these qualities are parts of the object, and that color is a true part of an objects nature. When this is proven to be incorrect, he claims that color is a secondary quality but primary qualities like shape/size are still part of the object and not the mind. When Philonous (Berkeley) is able to prove even this to be wrong, Hylus says that he wishes to quit his old notions and is embarrassed (by his ignorance). It is therefore fair to conclude that Philonous has won the argument and that he is correct in thinking that the qualities of an object are in the mind and not the object itself. It seems to me like this argument works quite well and that it definitely does support idealism in thinking that everything needs to be perceived by a mind (in order to exist). Although I am not an idealist myself I think that this argument is successful.
ReplyDeleteAlthough I do not agree with Berkeley's conclusion, the "mite argument" he provides for idealism is pretty successful; it is clear and simple. To summarize his argument: He begins, using an analogy, under the basis that size must be based only on perception and the mind of which it is perceived. He brings up a mite, something that would be a very small thing to us humans. He continues to recognize that a mite would determine the size of the foot of another creature based on its own; a foot that would be large to it might be a human while a foot that might be small might be a microscopic organism. To convince Hylas, Philonous concludes by clarifying that something small to one being might be absurdly large to another, and that, those two qualities cannot both (physically) exist within the same entity. Based on his clear argument that uses a simple reference, I cannot say that I disagree with Berkeley's (Philonous') logic. I believe it works in his favor during this specific instance. Although we do have modern measurement scales and measurement "languages," a simple small or large is, in fact, entirely based on perception in our society. In other words, choosing whether we say small or large is up to the individual mind and the individual mind alone. It is not something that anyone can argue. Berkeley made this clear for the purposes of his argument. Up to this point, I was skeptical in his argument for idealism. I could not wrap my head around the fact that an entire physical object is not so and that it is a collection of ideas. Breaking it down into this specific piece, I would argue that Berkeley won this one. Like Hylas, at this point in the entire course of his investigation, "I own I am at a loss what to think" (Berkeley 25).
ReplyDeleteBerkeley argues that physical qualities like size is not a property intrinsic to an object. He claims that size is relative. While humans might think a foot is of normal size, a mite would say that the foot is enormous. Therefore, he concludes that size is only in the mind.
ReplyDeleteIn his argument Berkeley attacks an incorrect interpretation of how size is defined. The idea that Berkeley attacks is a comparative evaluation between the perciever and the object of evaluation. When a person says "wow you're really short!", what is being conveyed is that that person is short relative to the perciever. Berkeley's attack would be true against this particular conception of size, however this conception is incorrect. Berkeley's argument should focus on a conception of size that describes a comparison between the object of evaluation and another object external to the perciever. This sufficiently avoids Berkeley's argument, since Berkeley attacks a conception of size that is subjective to the perciever. The conception of size as a comparison between two objects external to the speak provides an objective evaluation of the size of an object since two percievers would percieve the object being used to compare the object of evaluation in the same way. Both a mite and a person could easily and correctly say "that banana is two apples long". Using an external conception of size would allow us to describe size outside of our minds.
Berkeley might reply by saying that the size of the apple is in the mind, however we do not need to describe the exact size of an apple. For us to describe size, we do not need to know how large the apple is since our measurements are all relative to the size of the apple. For this reason, we use standard measurements system, ie meters or feet. By describing things in meters we do not need to be able to describe the size of a meter. Thus, when we say "this room is 100 meters long", we are simply saying "this room's size is 100 times that of a meter".
In trying to prove idealism, Berkley sets up the point that the qualities that seem to us as “inherent” or “primary” of any given object are all within the mind, and that the existence of any given object comes from the mind itself. Attempting to prove this claim, Berkeley (via Philonous) creates the premise that an object cannot have two opposing qualities at once; basically saying that two qualities which are mutually exclusive cannot both be used to accurately describe the same thing. If one were to consider a situation where an object’s primary qualities are used to describe it, but two reference points come to different conclusions, this would mean that the primary quality of the object is not actually inherent to the object, but in the mind, giving rather unarguable evidence for idealism. One famous example of Berkeley’s attempts at this proof involves a Human, a Mite, and a smaller Microorganism. The three sentient creatures look at the Mite’s foot and consider the foot’s size; size being the primary quality of the foot, something most people would have considered to be inherent to the foot, and not in the mind of the perceiver. But the issue is quickly discovered: The human finds the foot to be small, the mite finds it to be normally sized, and further still, and the microorganism sees the mite’s foot as a giant object. Three minds looking at the size, a primary quality of objects, and coming to different conclusions; surely this must mean that size is in fact not a primary quality, and that it is actually in the mind of the perceiver.
ReplyDeleteThere is however a major issue with the claim that cannot be ignored: Size is not an opinion, but the words “Large” and “Small” are heavily subjective and involve a reference point, something that is hard to agree on without involving relative terms and often reducing the argument to the idea that opinions are inside the mind. By using the words “large” and small, there is a non-verbal implication of “compared to my point of view” that entirely changes the argument; Berkeley took scalar quantities and switched it with opinions, which are by definition inside of the mind, to prove that the scalar-quantity equivalent of the opinion is inside the mind. The Mite, Human, and Microorganism do not refer to the size of the Mite’s foot; there is no reference to the dimensions using units, which would be one way to explain size of the foot, but instead a reference-based term (Large/Small) is used to prove the relativity of something otherwise not-relative (Actual physical Size). Granted, the measured size of an object is relative to the unit of measurement, but it is not nearly the same argument, as the relative size compared to an agreed-upon unit results in an answer that is agreed upon by multiple reference points. Further still, instead of referring to the size of the Mite’s foot in nanometers, one could use any agreeable dimension that would lead all 3 perspectives to one conclusion. The human, for instance, would agree that according to the Microorganism that the Mite’s foot is large, the Microorganism would certainly agree, and so would the Mite, seeing as the Microorganism is not nearly as large as the Mite’s foot. In this way, Berkeley’s attempt to disqualify primary qualities of objects falls short; when disproving the reality of the size of an object, it is probably best to use an objective size in the argument instead of opinions.
In his dialogues, Berkeley has a discussion between Philonous and Hylas about size perception. He starts by stating that an animal can have the same perceptions as us. He is setting himself up to prove that size is just perception. After stating that animals have perceptions he poses a hypothetical situation; imagine that there is a mite right below your foot. To the mite its foot is a normal size but to you its foot is extremely small. Similarly your foot is massive to the mite but to you it is a normal size. Berkeley is trying to argue that size is in the mind and not the object because if it were in the object then it could not be both small and large at the same time. This argument is not successful. Berkeley is blatantly ignoring the universal measurement systems we have put into use. Even though your foot seems huge to the mite and normal to you it is still a set size i.e. 10 inches. The perception of size is in the mind but size itself is in the object. This is why Berkeley is wrong in this instance.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley attempts to create an argument for idealism through the relativity of perception. In my opinion, Berkeley is unsuccessful, because he does not account for the perceptions of God or invariable measurements.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley begins by concluding that animals, also, have senses similar to humans. He then goes on to argue that “A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible” (24). He claims that a human would see the mite as extremely small size, and the mite’s foot is even smaller, but the mite sees his own foot as a normal size. A smaller animal than a mite would view the mite’s foot as big. How can an object be both small and large at the same time? Berkeley agrees that one object cannot have different sizes at the same time. Size, a primary quality, differs from different vantage points and perceptions. This is the problem with materialism and realism that Berkeley answers with idealism I agree with his claims that size is a primary quality that differs from each human and animals perceptions.
The key words in the conclusion are humans and animals, a problem with Berkeley’s argument is that the does not address the presence of God. God, being the omnipotent and omniscient being will always be perfect, as accepted by Berkeley. His perceptions of primary qualities must be correct, or God would have an imperfection. If there is one completely correct perception of one of these primary qualities, then it becomes an objective quality, instead of a subjective quality. Another problem that faces Berkeley’s argument is that measurements will not change. If the mite’s foot is 1 cm long, this will not change based off different people or animals perceptions. The length of the foot will remain 1 cm long, no matter what person, animal, or God assesses the mite’s foot. If objects are assessed by their measurements and not the descriptive qualities, then Berkeley’s argument will not work.
Berkeley’s argument at its most basic level is that objects cannot be huge and small at the same time, but rather that their size only exists in the mind of the perceiver; big and small are relative qualities. He first starts off by asserting that a mite perceives things differently that a human does, and that something that is much smaller than a mite (microorganism) would perceive things. “A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal and even less than it, as bodies of considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible…” (24). In this, he states that what appears normal to a mite seems extremely small to a human, and that what appears normal to a human seems “mountainous” (24) to a mite. But now Berkeley has run into a problem: how can things be huge and tiny at the same time? They cannot, and therefore size can only exist in the mind of the perceiver; it is not a physical, inherent quality in objects.
ReplyDeleteI believe that this argument is for the most part successful. Some people might say that there are objective ways to measure objects that are inherent qualities of the object. Since our units of measurement are arbitrary, there is some subjectivity to the way we measure things, therefore failing to achieve the desired objectivity that it was supposed to provide us with. But let’s say that measurement is objective. Does that change our perception of the size of objects, which is the most important piece of this argument? It doesn't matter whether an object is 2 m long or 2 millimeters long; how we perceive size is how size exists to us. And since there is no one objectively correct way to perceive size, therefore it must be in the mind of each perceiver.
Berkeley’s main argument for his idealism from the relativity of perception is that our senses cannot be trusted to determine the true characteristics of any object or person because we base our senses off of what we believe to be accurate in relation to our own selves. Berkeley says that if a microorganism, a mite, and a human being were all asked to describe the size of the mite’s foot, all three answers would be different. The microorganism would say that the mite’s foot is very large, in relation to the microorganisms’ own body. The mite would say that his own foot is normal sized, in relation to his own body. And the human would say that the mites’ foot is tiny, in relation to the humans’ own body. This is where Berkeley’s argument seems to be proven true because we know that it is not possible for multiple relative terms, such as large and small, to be true at the same time. For example, a mites’ foot cannot be described as big, small, and normal at the same time because all of those sizes are different for the same object. Since we know that this is not possible, it is safe to say that Berkeley’s argument regarding the relativity of perception is true and that our senses cannot be trusted to judge the characteristics of any object or person.
ReplyDeleteBerkley's theories of perception are undermined by established measurements that can be defined outside the mind. His claims that objects properties are relative and based on perceptions of the mind fall apart when applied to modern science. In his argument for size being extrinsic Berkley's argument is as follows, We perceive mites as being small creatures. Mites perceive themselves to be a normal size.So they are normal and big at the same time if the property of size is intrinsic to the mite. Nothing can be both large and small at the same time, therefore size is relative to the mind, and in conclusion size is not an intrinsic value of the mite. This theory that the mind determines these values is incompatible with systems of measurements which give objects intrinsic values, no matter the perceptions of humans. Measurements can now completely replace perceptions when referencing quantities . Since these objects no longer have to rely on perceptions for a premise, and only have one value that remains constant, it can no longer be concluded that they belong only in our mind. Berkley's other theories of values, like heat, are also disproven when evaluated by measurements and technologies, which have no connection to human perceptions. The same idea that when given a unchanging quantity they lose the ability to reach the premise of two things not being able to exist at the same time. Measurements remove perceptions as a valid premise for Berkley's theories, and place a unchanging value into the role of varying perceptions, which does not allow him to conclude that certain qualities are only perceptions of our minds.
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